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I. INTRODUCTION
In the health care debate, one of the targets that critics have focused
on has been health insurance plans. Some critics point to large profits
for the industry, at a time when many individuals are having difficulty
affording insurance. 1 Others point to enormous rate hikes, such as
Anthem Blue Cross of California’s much publicized proposed increase
of rates by up to thirty-nine percent. 2
Another favorite target has been the Medicare Advantage (MA)
program. MA is the part of Medicare in which Medicare beneficiaries
select a private health plan for their coverage (Part C). 3 Large health
plans such as UnitedHealthcare, Humana, and Kaiser are participants. 4
Critics frequently point to the “overpayments” that MA plans receive, in
comparison to the costs under the traditional Medicare program. 5 As

1. See Nicole Gaouette, Humana’s Profit Criticized by Senate Leader’s Aide, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ahuWRmei0TW0
(quoting Jim Manley, aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, “It’s no wonder why Humana has
been misleading seniors about health insurance reform . . . . They saw their profits rise 65 percent
last quarter and want to make sure the gravy train doesn’t end.”); Health Insurance Industry Profits
CARE
FOR
AM.
NOW
(2010),
http://hcfan.3cdn.net/
Surge
Again,
HEALTH
d605c2281191ac1f04_kam6bn3ga.pdf (subtitled “Fewer Members, Skimpier Benefits, Lower
Spending on Care Add Up for Investors While Consumers Suffer”).
2. See Nadja Popovich, Insurer's Rate Hike Becomes Administration Talking Point, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2010, 9:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/
insurers_rate_hike_becomes_adm.html. This proposed increase was later rescinded when it was
found that Anthem had made actuarial errors in determining its projected costs. See Scott Hensley,
California Insurer Drops Rate Hikes After Errors Are Found, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 30, 2010,
9:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/04/california_insurer_drops_rate.html.
3. OFFICE OF HEALTH POL’Y, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING &
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PAYMENT FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
PLANS: POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS v (2009), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/09/
medicareadvantage/report.pdf [hereinafter PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS].
4. Marsha Gold, Dawn Phelps, Gretchen Jacobson & Tricia Neuman, Medicare Advantage
2010 Data Spotlight: Plan Enrollment Patterns and Trends, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 5 (June
2010), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8080.pdf.
5. See Jill Wechsler, Medicare Advantage Plans Under Attack, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXEC.,
Mar. 1, 2007, http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/mhe/Politics+and+Policy/
Medicare-Advantage-plans-under-attack/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/409178 (noting that “MA plans
are ‘vastly overpaid,’ according to Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Ways & Means
Health subcommittee.”); Philip Rucker, Hidden Costs of Medicare Advantage: Plans’ Free Perks Are
Subsidized By Government, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/14/AR2009101403953_pf.html (quoting Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV
(D-W.Va.), “[Medicare Advantage is] a wasteful, inefficient program and always has been. . . . [It is]
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determined by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC),
“MA payments per enrollee are projected to be 114 percent of
comparable FFS [fee-for-service] spending for 2009.” 6
There are two problems in “demonizing” 7 health insurance plans
and MA. 8 One is that it diverts attention from perhaps the most
important long-term problem for health care: the need to control rising
costs. Recent estimates say that expenditures on health care have grown
from approximately seven percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in
1970, to nine percent in 1980, twelve percent in 1990, fourteen percent
in 2000, and sixteen percent in 2008. 9 Expenditures are projected to be
over nineteen percent of GDP in 2019. 10 While it is certainly true that
health care insurance plans are not perfect and that there have been
“wasteful” 11 benefits offered by MA plans, simply addressing these will
not effectively control future health care costs.
Rising costs are primarily a function of inappropriate incentives in
the delivery of health care. As Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of
Nations, prices are the “invisible hand” that guides market participants.12
In most markets, prices act as signals to both producers and consumers.
However, in health care in the United States, prices simply do not work.

stuffing money into the pockets of private insurers, and it doesn’t provide any better benefits to
anybody.”); Ezra Klein, The Medicare Advantage Scam, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/10/the_medicare_advantage_scam.html.
6. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY xix (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/
Mar09_EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT].
7. See Press Release, America’s Health Insurance Plans, AHIP Statement on Status of Health
Care
Reform
(Aug.
4,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ahip.org/content/
pressrelease.aspx?docid=27953 (claiming that “a campaign has been launched to demonize health
plans”). See also Relapse: The Battle Between Politicians and Insurers Is Not Over, ECONOMIST,
May 15, 2010, at 74 (noting that “the administration is demonising insurers in an effort to transform
the new health law from an electoral liability into an asset”).
8. The Wall Street Journal editorial board also recently noted the dual attacks on health plans
and MA. See Farewell, Medicare Advantage, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2010, at A18 (noting that
“[t]his terror explains why Democrats are so intent on killing Medicare Advantage, and on blaming
someone else [health plans] for destroying a program that millions of seniors prefer”).
9. National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., tab.1
(2009), http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf [hereinafter NHE
Data].
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
10. NHE
Fact
Sheet,
CTRS.
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp (last visited Mar. 30,
2011) [hereinafter NHE Fact Sheet].
11. Rucker, supra note 5.
12. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
IV.2.9 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed. 1904), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Smith/smWN13.html.
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The health care system has created a number of distortions that
impede the ability of prices to perform their signaling function. The
predominant mode of compensating doctors is through “fee-for-service,”
in which a doctor receives compensation based on a list of services
performed. 13 The “price” for each service is based on a “cost-plus”
model, 14 where the doctor receives essentially the marginal cost of the
service plus an additional amount, which is designed to be enough to
cover a certain percentage of fixed costs and provide income for the
doctor. This system provides a strong incentive for doctors to over
provide services because their profits (based on the “plus” part of the
“cost-plus” model) increase consistently with greater quantities.
Furthermore, there is a stronger incentive to provide more costly services
because their “plus” part is larger than lower cost services.
Many have pointed to inefficient incentives created under the “feefor-service” system as being the primary cause of the rising costs of
health care. 15 In response, a number of recommended changes to the
health care payment system have been suggested.16 These include payfor-performance, competitive pricing, accountable care organizations,
and bundled payments. 17 Each of these plays a role in the landmark
health care reform legislation signed by President Barack Obama, the

13. Exec. Office of the President, Council of Econ. Advisors, The Economic Case for Health
Care Reform, 14 (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CEA_Health_Care_
Report.pdf. [hereinafter COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS]. The other predominant form of payment is
via a “capitation rate” in which a health plan receives a fixed amount per person (per head) enrolled
in the plan. See MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
14. See Bryan E. Dowd, Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman, & Steven D. Pizer, Fee-forService Medicare in a Competitive Market Environment, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 113, 113
(2005-06),
available
at
https://www.cms.gov/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/0506Winpg113.pdf.
15. See infra Part II. This article focuses on the problems associated with the pricing system
for payment for medical service providers, which is primarily done via federal programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid, along with payment by health insurance plans. However, other literature
examines problems with payment systems on the other side of the equation: the consumers of
medical services. See, e.g., Stephen P. Paschall, Health Care, the Price System and the Conflict
Between Access to Care and Cost-Containment, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 403 (2009). In the opinion of
this author, pricing reform on the supplier-side will be more effective than on the demand side, due
to difficulties with individual consumers’ ability to correctly quantify the value of a specific medical
service. For more on the problems of valuing esoteric goods such as environmental goods, see Dale
B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32
ENVTL. L. 57 (2002). For these reasons, this article will not address pricing reforms on the health
consumer side.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.A-D.
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 18 and the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. 19 The package also regulates
health plans and reduces payments under MA. 20 Nonetheless, while
these approaches should improve the delivery of health care, they will
not lead to any fundamental changes in health care incentives. In order
to address rising health care costs, we will need a new approach, a new
metric for health care payments.
The other problem in “demonizing” health insurance plans and MA
is that, in thinking that they are the problem, we lose track that they may
be part of the solution to the long-term need to control costs. In fact, this
article argues that health care insurance plans participating in MA offer
the best opportunity to transform incentives in health care.
This article proposes a systemic change to the payment system used
by the MA program. Under this new system, health plans would be
rewarded, not on the basis of how much care was provided, but rather on
the effectiveness of the care. In other words, these plans will receive
payments based on their delivery of “health outcomes,” not their
delivery of health services. Health outcomes include measures of
survival, data “derived from symptoms or even the results of physical
examinations,” and “the results of simple tests, like blood levels, or more
complex physiological measures.” 21 They also include “information
collected from patients, . . . reflect[ing] how they have experienced the
illness and the effects it has had on their lives.” 22 A number of obstacles
have hindered the consideration of using health outcomes alone as the
basis of a practical payment system, 23 but this article argues that these
obstacles can and should be overcome.
When their payments depend on health outcomes, health insurance
plans will have incentives to improve the quality and cost effectiveness
of health care, and these improvements will spread throughout these
organizations to the individual doctor level and also on to their patients.

18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
[hereinafter PPACA].
19. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) [hereinafter HCERA].
20. Anne Tergesen, Changes to Medicare Advantage, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB127336164057988979.html (noting that “the new health-care law
will divert some $132 billion from Medicare Advantage”).
21. ROBERT L. KANE, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES RESEARCH 5 (2d ed.
2006).
22. Id.
23. Some have proposed using health outcomes to determine whether providers are eligible
for bonus payments. See infra Part III.C.
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This approach has the benefit of using decentralized enforcement, with
flexible incentives tailored to individual contexts. 24
The rest of this article is as follows. We begin with an analysis of
the improper incentives generated under the fee-for-service system, and
then examine alternatives previously suggested. 25 We also examine how
the landmark health care reform legislation of 2010 addresses these
incentives. 26 We then present a different payment system based on
health outcomes, explaining how it would be implemented and
examining some of the challenges in doing so. 27
Drawing on previous research on environmental policies and
federalism, we find that, in order to be implemented properly, this
payment system should be directed at the level of health care plans. 28
We then examine the opportunity for implementing this system at the
level of health plans afforded by MA. 29 We conclude with an analysis of
the obstacles and opportunities of this approach. 30
II. IMPROPER INCENTIVES UNDER FEE-FOR-SERVICE
In the past forty years, health care expenditures have risen from
seven percent of GDP to over sixteen percent. 31 Within the next ten
years, they are expected to reach approximately one-fifth of GDP. 32 As
a cause of this rise, a number of authorities have pointed to significant
problems with the fee-for-service payment system. These problems
derive from the incentives generated under this system. These incentives
lead to too much care being provided, with a significant portion of that
care being of dubious value.
For example, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) explained, in its June 2009 Report to the Congress, that we
are “not buying enough recommended care” but are instead “buying too
much unnecessary care, much of it at very high prices, resulting in a
system that costs significantly more per capita than in any other

24. It will be difficult to develop these tailored incentives over large and diverse networks of
physicians, but over time, we may expect improvements in the management of these networks. See
infra Part VI.C.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See infra Part VII.
30. See infra Part VIII.
31. NHE Data, supra note 9, at tab.1.
32. NHE Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
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country.” 33 The principal reason cited by MedPAC is that “Medicare’s
fee-for-service (FFS) payment systems reward more care—and more
complex care—without regard to the quality or value of that care.” 34
Health care expert David Cutler of Harvard has noted a similar
conundrum, where “the marginal value of many services is low and
many people go without valuable care.” 35 He gives examples of the
overuse of “high-tech medical services,” and notes that “Medicare
spending, for example, varies by a factor of two between different
regions of the country, with the gap typically associated with differential
use of very expensive procedures.” 36 Despite these spending disparities,
“[p]eople appear no healthier in regions that spend more compared to
regions that spend less.” 37 On the other hand, Cutler also notes that an
important example of the under-provision of health care is for
prescription drugs: “Less than half of patients who would benefit from
beta blockers after a heart attack receive these drugs . . . despite the fact
that such drugs cut the mortality risk in half.” 38 For the cause of these
inefficiencies, Cutler points to both the fee-for-service system and the
low out-of-pocket costs for patients with strong insurance coverage,
causing them to “demand care with any medical value.” 39 He concludes
that “[o]n both the demand and supply sides of the market, the incentives
are to overconsume high-tech care.” 40
President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors described these
and other inefficiencies of fee-for-service in The Economic Case for
Health Care Reform. 41 In addition to the incentives to increase volume
under fee-for-service, the FFS system also may “reward poor quality of

33. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Improving Incentives in
the Medicare Program, xi (June 2009), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf
[hereinafter June 2009 MEDPAC Report].
34. Id.
35. David M. Cutler, Walking the Tightrope on Medicare Reform, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
45, 51(2000); Donald A. Brand, Lee N. Newcomer, Anne Freiburger & Hao Tian, Cardiologists’
Practices Compared with Practice Guidelines: Use of Beta-Blockade After Acute Myocardial
Infarction, 26 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 1432, 1435 (1995); Stephen B. Soumerai, Thomas J.
McLaughlin, Donna Spiegelman, Ellen Hertzmark, George Thibault & Lee Goldman, Adverse
Outcomes of Underuse of β-Blockers in Elderly Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 277
JAMA 115, 119-20 (1997); Thomas J. Wang & Randall S. Stafford, National Patterns and
Predictors of β-Blocker Use in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1901, 1903-05 (1998).
36. Cutler, supra note 35, at 51.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 52.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 14.
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care by paying for the costs associated with additional medical care
necessary to fix errors that could have been prevented.” 42 Also, the FFS
system generates “strong financial incentives to compete on the basis of
technology adoption rather than price, leading to an excess supply of
high technology equipment and services (for example, MRI machines
and minimally invasive vascular diagnostic and procedure suites) and
accelerated replacement of hospital beds in local markets.” 43 Another
significant problem is due to the lack of incentives under the FFS system
“for effectively managing patients with chronic illnesses or educating
patients about preventing disease through lifestyle changes such as
exercise, improved nutrition, and smoking cessation.” 44
Harold Miller, another “national expert on health care reform,” 45
makes similar critiques. He notes, “Payment systems for health care
today are based on rewarding volume, not value for the money spent.” 46
Meanwhile, he explains, “Current payment systems often penalize
providers financially for keeping people healthy, reducing errors and
complications, and avoiding unnecessary care.” 47
Thus, we see that the fee-for-service system creates incentives by
rewarding volume but not quality or outcomes. This leads to a number
of problems: provision of a substantial amount of care with little value,
under-provision of other care with higher value, perverse incentives for
poor quality care as services to correct for earlier errors lead to higher
levels of compensation, excessive use of high technology equipment, an
oversupply of hospital beds, and insufficient incentives for managing
and educating patients through low-cost ways of improving their health.
In the end, this payment system rewards health care providers more if
their patients are less healthy.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO FEE-FOR-SERVICE
As Stuart Guterman and others have noted, “To change the way
health care is organized and delivered, we need to change the way it is
42. Id. (citing David Studdert, Michelle Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches,
Jordan Peugh, Kinga Zapert, & Troyen A. Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2616 (2005)).
43. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 14.
44. Id.
45. Sarah A. Rigg, An Interview with Harold Miller, DETROIT BUS. NEWS, July, 29, 2009,
available
at
http://www.mlive.com/business/detroit/index.ssf/2009/07/an_interview_with_harold_mille.html.
46. Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28
HEALTH AFF. 1418, 1418 (2009).
47. Id.
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paid for—mov[ing away] from FFS payments.” 48 One way to do this
would be to adopt a capitation model, where providers are paid a
specified amount (which may be risk adjusted) for each beneficiary they
service. 49 This is the model adopted by the MA program, prior to the
modifications under the health reform legislation. 50 However, the
capitation model also leads to inappropriate incentives. As noted by
Robert Mechanic and Stuart Altman, “capitation creates financial
incentives for physicians to withhold care.” 51
Instead, in order to combat the perverse incentives created by the
fee-for-service system, scholars have suggested a variety of other
approaches. These include a pay-for-performance (frequently referred to
as either P4P or value-based purchasing) system, competitive pricing,
accountable care organizations, and bundled payment systems. After
examining these, we will see how these alternatives were incorporated
into the health care reform legislative package.
A.

Pay-for-Performance

Pay-for-performance is a payment system in which providers of
health services receive bonuses for meeting certain performance
targets. 52 Much of the time, the measures used to determine pay for
performance are simply whether certain treatment guidelines are
followed. 53 For example, measures to assess the quality of ambulatory
care include the use of certain screening tests, vaccinations, and
therapies. 54 The recent interest in pay-for-performance began with two
reports issued by the Institute of Medicine in 1999 and 2001. 55

48. Stuart Guterman, Karen Davis, Stephen Schoenbaum & Anthony Shih, Using Medicare
Payment Policy to Transform the Health System: A Framework for Improving Performance, 28
HEALTH AFF. 238, 239 (2009).
49. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7.
50. Id.
51. Robert E. Mechanic & Stuart H. Altman, Payment Reform Options: Episode Payment Is a
Good Place to Start, 28 HEALTH AFF. 262, 266 (2009).
52. Kathleen J. Mullen, Richard G. Frank & Merideth B. Rosenthal, Can You Get What You
Pay For? Pay-for-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers 2 (Rand Labor and
Population, Working Paper No. WR-680, 2009), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/working_papers/2009/RAND_WR680.pdf.
53. Id.
54. See INST. OF MED., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: ACCELERATING IMPROVEMENT, 20406 tbl.G-1 (2006), available at http://books.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=11517&page=204.
55. JIM HAHN, PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2006), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/3009.pdf (citing INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1999); INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)).
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A number of pay-for-performance experiments were tried in the
early 2000s. The results were not promising. Meredith Rosenthal notes,
“Both the enthusiastic adoption and somewhat lackluster early results of
pay for performance have given rise to a broader payment-reform
movement.” 56
In an early study of pay-for-performance, Rosenthal and others
found little improvement from the adoption of a pay-for-performance
program: “Paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed performance
target may produce little gain in quality for the money spent and will
largely reward those with higher performance at baseline.” 57 In a more
recent study, Rosenthal and others similarly conclude, “[W]e fail to find
evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement
in quality or notable disruption in care.” 58
However, some have suggested that there have been some limited
successes. Francis J. (Jay) Crosson notes that “the modest pay-forperformance (P4P) incentives in the CMS Premier Hospital Quality
Incentive Demonstration and the Physician Group Practice
Demonstration have succeeded.” 59
A number of reasons have been suggested for the poor performance
of pay-for-performance. Some point to the inappropriate metrics utilized
by pay-for-performance systems, i.e., the use of a particular treatment as
recommended by the guidelines. Consequently, these payment systems
create incentives to follow these guidelines, without any direct
connection to whether these guidelines are successful for individual
patients.
Elliott Fisher and others have criticized pay-for-performance (P4P)
mechanisms because they provide incentives at the wrong level—the
individual doctor level. 60 This focus is inappropriate because, as they

56. Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging Models of ProviderPayment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197 (2008) (describing a number of payment
reform models, including refusing payment for “avoidable complications,” “primary care payment
reform” such as payment under capitation, “episode-based payment,” and “shared savings”). See
also Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264 (2009) (stating that “few programs have been
formally evaluated, and those that have show mixed results”).
57. Meredith B. Rosenthal, Richard G. Frank, Zhonghe Li & Arnold M. Epstein, Early
Experience with Pay-for-Performance: From Concept to Practice, 294 JAMA 1788, 1788 (2009).
58. Mullen et al., supra note 52, at 28.
59. Francis J. Crosson, Medicare: The Place to Start Delivery System Reform, 28 HEALTH
AFF. 232, 233 (2009) (noting however that “there is little evidence that small (2-5 percent) payment
incentives are likely to drive individual specialists”).
60. Elliott S. Fisher, Douglas O. Staiger, Julie P.W. Bynum & Daniel J. Gottlieb, Creating
Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. 44, 44
(2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2131738/.
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note, “The provision of high-quality care for any serious illness requires
coordinated, longitudinal care and the engagement of multiple
professionals across different institutional settings.” 61 The focus on
individual doctors is also problematic because “many of the most serious
gaps in quality can be attributed to poor coordination and faulty
transitions.” 62
Another part of the problem with pay-for-performance is that, as it
is currently designed and implemented, it provides incentives to improve
quality but without regard for cost. As James Robinson and others have
noted, “The turn toward quality improvement and away from cost
moderation improved quality but helped fuel the resurgence of cost
inflation.” 63 Thus, pay-for-performance, similar to fee-for-service,
creates a disincentive to adopting cost-effective treatments that are not
specifically designated under the treatment guidelines.
A policy paper issued by researchers at the U.S. Department of
Human Services examines whether pay-for-performance should be
applied to MA. 64 They note a number of difficulties in applying pay-forperformance to MA. These difficulties include:
[A] lack of sufficient health outcomes measures (as opposed to process
and satisfaction measures that are captured by HEDIS [Healthcare
Effectiveness Data and Information Set] and CAHPS [Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems]), and that this would
be an important limiting factor in the ability to accurately measure and
reward plan performance. 65

Similar to the arguments above, they note that “while there are
reasons to believe that these types of programs can improve
beneficiaries’ health while reducing costs, there is not definitive
evidence that they will lead to improved performance.” 66

61. Id. at 45.
62. Id.
63. James C. Robinson, Thomas Williams & Dolores Yanagihara, Measurement of and
Reward for Efficiency in California’s Pay-for-Performance Program, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1438, 1439
(2009). See also Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264 (noting that “P4P programs are
unlikely to affect spending trends as long as their primary emphasis is rewarding providers for
delivering ‘underused’ services rather than for judicious use of potentially ‘overused’ treatments”);
Robert Galvin, Pay-for-Performance: Too Much of a Good Thing? A Conversation with Martin
Roland, 25 HEALTH AFF. 412 (2006) (discussing a P4P plan in the United Kingdom with actual
payments that exceeded expected payments by almost 40%: $2.5 billion instead of $1.8 billion).
64. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 24.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 4
9-THOMPSON 44.3 PROOF-DONE

738

B.

7/1/2016 4:12 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:727

Competitive Pricing

Robert Berenson notes that the traditional Medicare FFS
benchmarks used for establishing MA payments are inappropriate, due to
differential market settings. 67 Berenson notes that “in areas with the
highest traditional Medicare spending, health plans’ bids are about 10
percent below traditional Medicare spending, while in the lowestspending traditional Medicare areas, plans’ bids are about 21 percent
above traditional program spending.” 68 This is because the benchmarks
“do not reflect cost differences faced by local plans as a result of local
market factors.” 69
To address these concerns, Bryan Dowd, Robert Berenson, and
others have suggested using a competitive pricing model. 70 Under a
competitive pricing model, health plans submit bids for servicing their
enrolled beneficiaries. These bids would be to provide a “‘community
norm’ [benefit] package that [would] include supplementary benefits.” 71
These bids are based on the expected costs of servicing these
beneficiaries. These bids would then be used to determine benchmarks
for establishing how much of the plans would be paid by Medicare. 72
Plans whose bids exceeded the benchmarks would be required to collect
the difference in the form of premiums from beneficiaries.
In February 2009, the Obama administration proposed the adoption
of competitive pricing for MA plans. 73 Bryan Dowd, Robert Coulam,
and Roger Feldman have proposed extending the competitive pricing
model to all Medicare plans, not just MA ones.74 However, competitive

67. Robert A. Berenson, From Politics to Policy: A New Payment Approach in Medicare
Advantage, 27 HEALTH AFF. 156, 160 (2008).
68. Id. at 160.
69. Id.
70. Id. See also Dowd et al., supra note 14, at 117.
71. Robert A. Berenson & Bryan E. Dowd, Medicare Advantage Plans at A Crossroads—Yet
Again, 28 HEALTH AFF. 29, 31 (2009).
72. One approach suggested by Bryan Dowd and others is to set the benchmark at the lowest
bid for the geographical area. See Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd,
Competitive Pricing for All Medicare Health Plans, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH
(2009), http://www.aei.org/outlook/100060 (noting that this would have benefits for low bidders
through increased enrollments and penalties for high bidders). Other approaches to setting the
benchmark based on these bids are also possible, such as a second-price auction, which reduces
incentives to inflate bids.
73. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING
AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10newera.pdf.
74. Coulam et al., supra note 72, at 1.
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pricing proposals have faced significant political opposition. 75 In the
past twenty-five years, attempts to utilize competitive pricing have been
frequently scuttled as a result of this opposition. 76
This history repeated itself in the current health reform legislation.
Section 3201 77 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
mandated that MA benchmarks would be based on competitive bids. 78
However, section 1102 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act repealed section 3201, replacing the Competitive Bidding structure
with one based on Medicare FFS rates. 79
C.

Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)

Another significant proposal has been a call for “Accountable Care
Organizations” (ACOs). Elliott Fisher and others have suggested that
significant improvements can be made by shifting payment systems
away from the level of the individual doctor, and instead creating a
payment system directed at “accountable care organizations comprising
local hospitals and the physicians who work within and around them.” 80
They note a number of advantages to this approach. 81 One is related to
performance measures. 82 They cite a need for “measures that focus on
the longitudinal experience of Medicare beneficiaries (including
measures of total costs and health outcomes), as well as measures that
directly address the current fragmentation of care.” 83 They conclude,
“Aggregating performance measurement to the level of large physician
groups is the only approach, we believe, to achieving this dual
75. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting that “in the past, . . . health plans
and their supporters have resisted such a bidding approach”); id. at 18 (“[A competitive bidding]
system, as in any competitive market, means increased uncertainty about the chances for reward and
the risk of financial loss for participants. Previous experience with Medicare’s competitive pricing
demonstrations, which were opposed by the insurance industry, suggests that health plans are
reluctant to participate under such pricing uncertainty.”) (citing Berenson et al., supra note 71, at
30-32).
76. See id. at 29; Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd, Don’t Forget to Save
Medicare: Competitive Pricing, Not Price Controls, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH,
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Handout%20on%20Medicare%20Competitive%20Pricing%20Attempts.
pdf. See also Dowd et al., supra note 14, at 117 (describing how demonstration projects were
“blocked” by Congress, with the aid of a Federal judge).
77. Unless otherwise noted, all section references of the PPACA refer to TITLE III—
Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care.
78. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3201(a), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
79. HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1102(a), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
80. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 45.
81. Id. at 51.
82. Id. at 52.
83. Id.
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objective.” 84 They also note that “physicians’ resistance to public
reporting could be mitigated by aggregation to these larger entities.” 85
Finally, there are economies of scale in collecting this information: “The
administrative complexity of data collection methods and auditing
procedures for 5,000 hospitals would be much less daunting than those
required to collect and audit data on the 500,000 physicians practicing in
the United States.” 86
Another advantage of a payment system at the level of an ACO
would be to “establish accountability for local decisions about
capacity.” 87 Their final advantage is due to another economy of scale:
Larger organizations [have the] capacity to invest in improving quality
and lowering costs. Most physicians remain in solo or small group
practices and have neither the capital nor organizational capacity to
invest in health information systems, the implementation of care
management protocols, or ongoing quality improvement initiatives.
Hospitals or large medical groups are much better positioned to invest
in such systems and to provide financial and technical support to
physicians aligned with their institution. 88

In another article, Elliott Fisher and others lay out how the ACO
system would operate. 89 They would utilize a “clear and specific
spending benchmark for each ACO” 90 based upon “the most recent three
years of per beneficiary total parts A and B spending for beneficiaries
assigned to the ACO.” 91 They would also utilize performance
measures. 92 Currently, the measures would be quality-based, but might
extend to outcomes in the future: “[W]e believe that these measures
should rapidly move from the current generation of technical quality
measures to focus on patient-level health outcome and experience
measures that reflect ACOs’ ability to deliver patient-centered care that
is well coordinated across providers and improves outcomes for
patients.” 93 However, the payment mechanism recommended here still

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id.
89. Elliott S. Fisher, Mark B. McClellan, John Bertko, Steven M. Lieberman, Julie J. Lee,
Julie L. Lewis & Jonathan S. Skinner, Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in
Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219, 219 (2009) [hereinafter Fostering Accountable Health Care].
90. Id. at 223.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 221.
93. Id. at 223.
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creates a binary incentive: those ACOs that meet the performance
standards are entitled to “shared savings,” 94 but the amount of this
payment is not adjusted based upon an individual ACO’s specific report
of these statistics. In other words, as long as the performance targets are
met, an ACO receives no additional savings for better performance.
In its June 2009 Report to Congress, MedPAC advocated the use of
ACOs. 95 This was because “financial incentives would lead the ACO to
judiciously constrain the use of health care services and capacity in
contrast to the incentive in FFS payment systems to always increase the
volume of services.” 96 This report also explained how this would be
implemented: “Providers in voluntary ACOs would continue to be paid
standard FFS Medicare payment rates. Bonuses would depend on
meeting both spending and quality targets.” 97
One study of the effects of coordination of care on health outcomes
had discouraging results. Deborah Peikes and others concluded that
essentially there were no differences in hospitalization rates: “Thirteen
of the 15 programs showed no significant . . . differences in
hospitalizations; however, Mercy had 0.168 fewer hospitalizations per
person per year . . . and Charlestown had 0.118 more hospitalizations per
person per year.” 98 They also found that “none of the 15 programs
generated net savings,” and that “[t]hese programs had favorable effects
on none of the adherence measures and only a few of many quality of
care indicators examined.” 99 Their results suggested that cost savings
were unlikely, but that some cost-neutral improvements in “patients’
well-being” could be possible. 100 Thus, while there are significant
theoretical advantages in an ACO model, additional evidence is needed
to determine their actual effects.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contains two
sections directed at ACOs: Section 2706 of title II, the “Pediatric
Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project,” 101 and section

94. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395(2010) (amending title XVIII of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii) by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899(a)(1)(B)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(B) (2010))).
95. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at xiii.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 44.
98. Deborah Peikes, Arnold Chen, Jennifer Schore & Randall Brown, Effects of Care
Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare
Beneficiaries, 301 JAMA 603, 603 (2009).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 615.
101. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2706, 124 Stat. 119, 325 (2010).
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3022 of title III, the “Medicare Shared Savings Program.” 102 These will
be discussed more below.
D.

Bundling Payments for Episodes of Care

Other pricing reforms include “[c]hanging the method of payment
for hospital care from reimbursement for individual services to
prospectively set prices per case” on the basis of “diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs).” 103 Extensions of this include “bundl[ing] payments for
episodes of care,” as advocated by Robert Mechanic and Stuart
Altman, 104 and Stuart Guterman and others. 105
The intention of this system would be to “encourage greater
integration in the organization of health care delivery and the provision
of more coordinated care to beneficiaries.” 106 Under this system,
“physician group practices,” “hospital systems,” and “integrated delivery
systems (IDSs)” would receive a bundled payment. 107 These bundled
payments could either be a “global fee for primary care,” a “global DRG
[diagnosis-related group] case rate for hospitalization,” or a “global
payment per enrollee [a risk adjusted, pure capitation model].” 108 To be
entitled to receive these payments, providers would need to demonstrate
that they meet certain quality standards, shown by “obtain[ing] categoryspecific certification or accreditation by organizations such as the Joint
Commission or NCQA.” 109 They would also include “[r]ewards for
provider performance,” for “providers who perform well and show
improvement on relevant sets of performance metrics.” 110
They do note, however, certain impediments to implementing this
system, including concerns about “the assumption of risk for large
losses” and “the need to implement new systems to meet the
requirements for participation and accreditation/certification—such as
better implementation of evidence-based guidelines and rapid

102. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13951395iii) by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2010))).
103. S. E. Berki, DRGs, Incentives, Hospitals, and Physicians, 4 HEALTH AFF. 70, 70 (1985).
See also RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE
SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 40 (2006).
104. Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264.
105. Guterman et al., supra note 48, at 238.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 240.
108. Id. at 242-43.
109. Id. at 241.
110. Id. at 244.
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performance reporting.” 111 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act contains one section directed at this alternative, section 3023: the
“National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling.” 112
IV. REFORMS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT AND THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION
ACT
All of these previous proposals play a significant role in the
landmark health reform legislation package. 113 Pay-for-performance,
under its “value-based purchasing” name, plays a prominent role in
many sections.
Following up on provisions of the Medicare
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) which
“require[d] the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to develop a plan to transition to a value-based purchasing
program for Medicare payment,” 114 sections 3001, 3006, and 3007 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act respectively require the
establishment of pay-for-performance programs for hospitals, 115 “skilled
nursing facilities and home health agencies,”116 and individual
physicians. 117 These programs again reward medical service providers
for the use of tests, vaccinations, and therapies specified by performance
standards. 118
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are featured in sections
2706 of title II 119 and 3022 of title III 120 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Section 2706 sets up a demonstration project for
ACOs providing pediatric services. ACOs must meet “guidelines to

111. Id. at 247-48.
112. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3023, 124 Stat. 119, 399 (2010) (amending title XVIII of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii) by inserting § 1866D (codified as amended at
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2010))).
113. As noted above, competitive pricing initially was part of the reform legislation, but was
repealed by the second act.
114. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN TO TRANSITION TO A
MEDICARE VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM FOR PHYSICIAN AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES 3 (2008), available at http://www.cms.gov/physicianfeesched/downloads/physicianvbpplan-issues-paper.pdf.
115. PPACA § 3001(o)(1)(A).
116. Id. § 3006(a)(1).
117. Id. § 3007(p)(1).
118. See generally Mullen et al., supra note 52, at 16.
119. PPACA § 2706.
120. Id. § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii)
by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)
(2010))).
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ensure that the quality of care” 121 is high, and meet an “annual minimal
level of savings” 122 in order to receive an incentive payment. Section
3022 sets up a “Medicare Shared Savings Program” 123 for ACOs. 124 In a
similar manner, an ACO is entitled to “shared savings” if it “meets
quality performance standards,” 125 and “if the estimated average per
capita Medicare expenditures under the ACO for Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries for parts A and B services, adjusted for beneficiary
characteristics, is at least the percent specified by the Secretary below
the applicable benchmark.” 126
It is important to note that, while these ACOs must meet a certain
level of quality based on prescribed measures, this is only a threshold
test. Once the ACO meets these measures, their incentive payment is
completely unrelated to quality or outcomes of patient health, but rather
Consequently, this cost-based
is related to spending levels. 127
mechanism fails to provide a significant incentive to improve quality
beyond the threshold levels or to specifically improve patient health
outcomes.
Section 3023 sets up a “National Pilot Program on Payment
Bundling.” 128 This program makes payments for “integrated care during
an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a
hospitalization.” 129 Providers eligible for this program include “a
hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a home health
agency.” 130 These providers are paid “for the furnishing of applicable
services and other appropriate services, such as care coordination,
medication reconciliation, discharge planning, transitional care services,
and other patient-centered activities.” 131 These providers will also be
required to report information on “quality measures” including a number

121. PPACA § 2706(c)(1).
122. Id. § 2706(c)(2).
123. Id. § 3022.
124. It should be noted that health plans providing services under MA are not eligible for this
program. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13951395iii), § 1899(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(2010))).
125. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13951395iii), § 1899(d)(1)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(A)(i) (2010))).
126. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13951395iii), § 1899(d)(1)(B)(i) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(i) (2010))).
127. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 44.
128. PPACA § 3023.
129. Id. § 3023. In a similar manner, beneficiaries participating in MA are not eligible for this
program. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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of measurements of health outcomes. 132 However, payments will not be
adjusted according to performance on these quality measures.
The reform legislation includes a number of other provisions,
including the “[r]equirement to maintain minimum essential coverage”
by all individuals, 133 “employer responsibilities,” 134 and regulations of
health insurance plans. 135 Many provisions relate to the financing of
these policy changes. One such provision is the change to payment
formula for MA, section 1102 of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act. 136 This provision modifies the amount paid to MA
plans based upon Medicare fee-for-service rates. 137 It establishes a new
benchmark that is equal to one hundred percent of the FFS rate for the
area, multiplied by a factor that varies inversely with the relative
costliness of the area. 138 It also provides for “percentage quality
increases,” i.e., bonus payments, for plans that meet certain quality
standards, namely a ranking of four stars or higher (on a five-star
scale). 139
One more section of the health reform legislation should be
addressed: Section 3021 of title III of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. 140 This section “establish[es a] . . . Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within” the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services. 141 The purpose of this Center would be “to test
innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program
expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of care.” 142
This section perhaps provides an avenue for implementing the proposal
presented in this article below.

132. Id. (specifying specific measures including “(i) Functional status improvement; (ii)
Reducing rates of avoidable hospital readmissions; (iii) Rates of discharge to the community; (iv)
Rates of admission to an emergency room after a hospitalization; (v) Incidence of health care
acquired infections; (vi) Efficiency measures; (vii) Measures of patient-centeredness of care; (viii)
Measures of patient perception of care.”).
133. Id. § 1501.
134. PPACA §§ 1511-1515.
135. PPACA , §§ 1001-1304.
136. HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1102, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
137. Id. § 1102 (c)(3)(B)(iii).
138. Id. § 1102(n)(2)(C)(ii) (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §
1395w-23), § 1853(n)(2)(C)(ii)).
139. Id. § 1102 (c).
140. PPACA § 3021.
141. PPACA § 3021(a) (amending title XI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 13011320e-2), § 1115A(a)(1)).
142. Id.
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V. DETERMINING THE EFFICIENT METRIC FOR
HEALTH CARE PAYMENTS
In this section, we begin by explaining why our health care
payment metric should be based solely on health outcomes and not
include quality measures. We then examine obstacles to using health
outcomes as the sole metric. Resolving these, we present a specific
proposal where compensation depends on risk adjusted payments based
solely on health outcomes.
A.

Why We Need to Base Payments Solely on Health Outcomes

With the elimination of the competitive pricing reform, all of the
remaining payment system reforms in the health care reform legislation
emphasize the use of quality measurements to improve incentives. In
many cases, they combine this emphasis on quality with measures to
reduce costs. These cost measures, however, are derived via a
comparison with the costs under the inappropriate incentives of the feefor-service system.
At first glance, these reforms seem pretty good. Better quality at
lower cost—who would not want that?
Unfortunately, further
introspection reveals that these reforms continue to distort incentives.
The main problem is similar to what we saw before with pay for
performance: these payment systems based on quality measurements
create strong incentives to follow the guidelines without a direct
connection as to whether they are appropriate for an individual patient.
More often than not, these guidelines probably present the best approach
to treating the patient. But individual variations are significant factors in
practicing medicine. These quality measurements, however, may
provide a disincentive for adaptations based on an individual patient’s
particular situation. Researchers recommending the use of ACOs
recognize the fundamental incompleteness of quality measures because,
as noted above, 143 they recommend transitioning in the future from
“technical quality measures” 144 to greater incorporation of measures of
health outcomes.
Instead of quality measurements, we will be better off moving
exclusively to health outcomes metrics right away. As Robert Kane
explains, “The ‘outcomes’ examined in outcomes research are more
likely to approximate what one ultimately wants health care to achieve—

143. See supra Part III.C.
144. Fostering Accountable Health Care, supra note 89, at 223.
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improvements in functional status and quality of life.” 145 If these
outcomes are our ultimate objective, then rewarding providers based on
health outcomes themselves will generate appropriate incentives.
Providers will still have an incentive to consult quality guidelines
because those will lead to the best health outcomes in most cases.
Meanwhile, for more idiosyncratic cases, providers will have the
incentive to match the best treatment approach to their individual patient.
The other problem with these reforms is that, while they might not
increase overall costs as much as a fee-for-service system, the continued
use of the FFS cost structure as their ultimate frame of reference means
that the path of overall costs will continue to rise, without any ceiling.
As we will see later, a system based on health outcomes might provide
an opportunity—though it will be politically contentious—to place a
ceiling on this trend.
B.

Obstacles to Using Health Outcomes as the Metric

There are a number of obstacles to health outcomes as the
determinant of how health providers are rewarded. Doing this will place
significant risks on providers, frequently for factors upon which they
may have little control. 146 We will address this problem more below, 147
but its solution depends upon applying these metrics to the appropriate
level of providers.
Another significant obstacle is the deficiency of relevant current
data on health outcomes. Some have noted a “lack of meaningful,
actionable performance measures.” 148 Mechanic and Altman note that
although “process measures” such as the HEDIS data are available,
“clinical outcome measures such as death and complication rates
associated with surgery are more meaningful but are technically
problematic.” 149
There may be a simple explanation for this lack of data: there
simply has been no incentive to produce it. 150 With payments not
dependent upon health outcomes, there is a strong disincentive for any
single health provider to offer this data because, without a wide enough
frame of reference, this data might open the provider up to criticism for
145. KANE, supra note 21, at 3.
146. Id. at 6.
147. See infra Part V.C.
148. Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264.
149. Id.
150. Note that some of the reforms in the legislation do require the collection and reporting of
health outcome data.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 4
9-THOMPSON 44.3 PROOF-DONE

748

7/1/2016 4:12 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:727

poor performance in health outcomes. This suggests that the provision
of this information is a coordination problem, which might only be
solved by a mandate under which all providers must provide this
information.
There is a similar problem in environmental protection. Under a
command-and-control environmental protection program, individual
firms face disincentives to innovate in reducing pollution. If any firm
innovates, the improvement may become one of the technologies
required of each firm in that industry. In the end, the innovating firm is
left with no advantage vis-à-vis its competitors, but faces possibly higher
costs associated with the innovation.
In order to solve this problem, environmental regulators sometimes
must impose “technology-forcing” regulations. These are regulations
that require the adoption of environmental control technologies that
reduce pollution below the amount possible at the time of the enactment
of the regulations. As a result, “technology-forcing” regulations must
have required implementation dates far into the future beyond the date of
enactment.
This structure generates incentives for the development of
improved control technologies. In the time between the date of
enactment and the date of implementation, an external vendor (supplier)
of control technologies may develop an improved technology that meets
the future standard. Without the technology-forcing regulation, no
individual firm would have had the incentive to purchase this
technology, as noted above. On the other hand, the availability of the
technology means that firms will be unable to get the requirement for
future implementation reversed (which might happen if the technology
does not develop). Consequently, individual firms will have strong
incentives to purchase the innovative technology. This in turn means
that the technology vendor will have a significant incentive to develop
this technology, under the condition of the technology-forcing
regulation. 151
In a similar manner, compensating health providers on the basis of
health outcome measurements would generate strong incentives to
improve these measures. A particular health plan may feel that current
measures are inappropriate indicators of its performance. With better
measurements, it may expect to receive additional compensation for its

151. In essence, this is a reversal of Say’s law (which says that “Supply Creates its Own
Demand”): here, demand generates its own supply.
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performance. These expectations will provide an incentive for that plan
to invest in improvements in health outcome measurements.
Our experience with quality measurements for health care suggests
that these improvements may be feasible. As noted above, some
suggested that the lackluster results of early pay-for-performance
initiatives were due to inappropriate guidelines. Nonetheless, the
continued use of these initiatives generated incentives to develop
improved methods of evaluating quality. In a 2006 article, David Cutler
noted:
The most famous quality measurement initiatives are programs run by
state governments that rate the quality of bypass surgery performed in
their state. . . . Hospitals are required to submit to the state government
information about the clinical risk factors of all patients receiving
bypass surgery, and to indicate whether the patient died in the hospital
or not. The state then estimates a regression model to adjust death for
the severity of condition. Based on these regression models, hospital
or physician residuals are calculated and reported. 152

Just as with quality measurements, we can expect these incentives
to lead to significant improvements in measurements of health outcomes.
Yet another obstacle with transitioning to a health-outcomes-based
system would be the difficulty in determining specifically how such a
system would operate. While it might seem simple to “reward
outcomes,” doing so in practice is complicated by the need to do risk
adjustments and identify progress in outcomes. In the next section, we
present a specific proposal that lays out one methodology in rewarding
providers based on outcomes. In doing so, we discover an additional
problem that was alluded to earlier: political opposition to policy
choices embedded in the reward structure.
C.

Proposal

In this section, we propose one methodology for creating a payment
system that rewards health providers for their effects on health
outcomes. In doing so, we need to ensure that our proposal includes risk
Risk adjustment factors adjust the amount of
adjustment. 153
compensation a plan receives depending on the initial health

152. David M. Cutler, The Economics of Health System Payment, 154 DE ECONOMIST 1, 13
(2006).
153. Risk adjustment is necessary to prevent “cherry-picking” by health plans. Cherry-picking
is where a health plan selectively enrolls only healthier beneficiaries.
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characteristics of their enrollees. These adjustments are essential. Cutler
notes,
If insurers know that some elderly persons are healthy and others are
sick, they will attempt to select the healthy and repel the sick. This
may be more attractive than managing care more efficiently. I would
attempt to limit risk selection by age-adjusting premiums and
implementing more general risk adjustment methods. 154

Similarly, Berenson and Dowd have noted, “Initially, the AAPCC
adjusted only for beneficiaries’ age, sex, disability, and institutional and
Medicaid Status, and their county of residence,” but leaving out “health
status variables” created opportunities for selection bias by health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). 155 The methodologies of risk
adjustment have been developed for almost twenty years. 156 Medicare
has been using risk adjustment in consultations with health plans for
over ten years, 157 and risk adjustment also is included in many sections
of the health reform legislation. 158
To provide proper incentives, this health payment system should
reward providers for their differential effect on health outcomes. In
order to construct an estimate of this differential effect, we need to
compare the specific providers’ set of health outcomes with some
baseline. To develop this baseline, we can turn to “comparative
effectiveness” research in medical practice.159 This research examines

154. David M. Cutler, Cutting Costs and Improving Health: Making Reform Work, 14 HEALTH
AFF. 161, 166 (1995). See also Cutler, supra note 35, at 54 (citing Michael Rothschild & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976); David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of
Health Insurance, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7176, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7176.pdf.
155. Berenson et al., supra note 71, at 31 (citing Randall S. Brown, Dolores Gurnick Clement,
Jerrold W. Hill, Sheldon M. Retchin & Jeanette W. Bergeron, Do Health Maintenance
Organizations Work for Medicare?, 15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 7 (1993).
156. See, e.g., RANDALL S. BROWN, JEANETTE W. BERGERON, DOLORES GURNICK CLEMENT,
JEROLD W. HILL & SHELDON M. RETCHIN, THE MEDICARE RISK PROGRAM FOR HMOS –FINAL
SUMMARY REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION
(1993), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/pic/reports/cms/4934.pdf.
157. Risk adjustment became part of Medicare policy under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
See Joel S. Weissman, Melissa Wachterman & David Blumenthal, When Methods Meet Politics:
How Risk Adjustment Became Part of Medicare Managed Care, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 475
(2005).
158. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1343, 124 Stat. 119, 212 (2010).
159. See, e.g., PETER R. ORSZAG, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL
ROLE, Preface
(2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18ComparativeEffectiveness.pdf.
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the evidence from published research reports on the effectiveness of
medical treatment options. 160 Some have used this research to develop
models of treatment options. One such model is the Archimedes Model,
developed by David Eddy and others. 161 This Model is a “full-scale
simulation model of human physiology, diseases, behaviors,
interventions, and healthcare systems.” 162 As a model, the Archimedes
Model takes inputs such as populations and health care systems; it then
can determine the effects of interventions; and finally, it can then predict
optimal health outcomes across these different interventions. 163
Consequently, this model can then be used to develop a baseline for the
prediction of health outcomes for a given population. 164
With these considerations in mind, we will now specify a new
payment model for health care. We begin with some definitions of
mathematical variables. Let Qi be the quantity of individuals served by a
particular health care provider, i. Let Pi be a vector representing the
characteristics of this population. It will be of dimension Nx1, where N
is the number of characteristics. These characteristics will include
particular characteristics utilized for risk adjustment. Let Ωi be a vector
representing the health outcomes experienced by this population over a
particular time period. It is of dimension Mx1, where M is the number
of outcomes measured. V will represent the assessed valuation of
outcomes, and will be of dimension 1xM. A will be a matrix
representing the baseline treatment parameters, as determined by a
comparative effectiveness model such as Archimedes, and will be of
dimension MxN. δi will be a matrix representing the differential
treatment parameters of health care provider i (as contrasted with the
baseline model), and will be of dimension MxN. This matrix is not
directly observed. Finally, RABP will be a vector representing riskadjusted base payments to providers, and will be of dimension 1xN, i.e.,
one component corresponding to each population characteristic.
Average health outcomes observed for provider i will follow this
equation:

160. Id.
161. Archimedes—Founders, ARCHIMEDES, http://archimedesmodel.com/about-archimedesincorporated.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
162. What is the Archimedes Model?, ARCHIMEDES, http://archimedesmodel.com/
archimedesmodel.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
163. See generally id.
164. See generally id.
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Ωi = A* Pi - δi * Pi
(1)
This equation states that the health outcomes observed for provider
i will be diminished by the deviations of provider i as compared with the
baseline. 165
Health care providers will be paid a base amount (RABP), and then
the payment will be diminished according to a valuation in the deviation
in treatment:
Average Payment to Provider i = RABP* Pi – V * δi * Pi
(2)
Although we do not observe δi, we can use the equation (1) to solve
for an observable formula:
δi * Pi = A* Pi - Ωi =>
Average Payment to Provider i = RABP* Pi – V * (A* Pi - Ωi)
(3)
Thus, the total payment to provider i will be:
Total Payment to Provider i = Qi * [RABP* Pi – V * (A* Pi - Ωi)]
(4)
Thus, providers will receive a payment that depends on the number
of people serviced by them, a baseline amount, the particular risk
characteristics of their population, and the health outcomes achieved by
them. Providers observe all of the variables in equation (2),166 including
the providers’ own choice of δi. They therefore can make optimal
decisions for δi, balancing their costs with their payment benefits.
D.

Political Considerations Embedded in Vector V

While this payment mechanism makes logical sense, we need to
examine one component further: vector V. V specifies payment levels
for each outcome from 1 to M. In essence, each element of this vector
then is a political decision: How much should each outcome be

165. Note the provider may also have beneficial deviations which could lead to improved
health outcomes.
166. And in effect, equation (4).
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rewarded? As we saw before with “competitive pricing,” specification
of V may face significant political opposition. Some may question the
morality of placing a dollar value on a particular health outcome, while
others may question why some outcomes are worth more than others.
Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that health care resources
are scarce, and eventually, some choices must be made in allocating
them. As a result, there must be tradeoffs between achieving some
outcomes instead of others. Although contentious, specifying V will
improve the transparency of these tradeoffs. Doing so may also provide
an opportunity to limit total expenditures on health care.
VI. IDENTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE SCALE
In addition to specifying the payment formula, we also need to
designate the individuals and institutions responsible for different stages
of this payment reform policy. These decisions are closely related to
concerns about federalism in health care policy.
A.

Federalism and Economies of Scale

While Michael Leavitt was Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), he described the essential federalist character of health
care: “Efforts to improve the quality and cost of health care start with
national standards, but end with local control.” 167 To enable this, Leavitt
and HHS created “Chartered Value Exchanges” (CVEs) in which local
community health care leaders would collaborate to improve
performance and efficiency in the delivery of health care.168
The need for these national standards is shown by the literature
examining “geographic variation” in Medicare costs. 169 This research
finds significant geographic variations in per capita spending by
Medicare: “Per capita Medicare expenditures vary almost three-fold
between the highest and lowest spending areas.” 170 This research tries to
determine the causes of this variation, to see whether it is “due to

167. The Cornerstone: Building a Value-Driven Health-Care System for America, DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2007), http://archive.hhs.gov/valuedriven/cornerstone9.pdf.
168. See id.; Chartering Value Exchanges, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://archive.hhs.gov/valuedriven/communities/valueexchanges/exchanges.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2011).
169. See, e.g., Marsha Gold, Geographic Variation in Medicare per Capita Spending: Should
Policy-Makers be Concerned?, SYNTHESIS PROJECT RESEARCH REP. NO. 6, Introduction (2004),
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/RWJF%20Medicare%20SYNTHESIS%20July04.pdf.
170. Id. at 4.
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differences in population mix and prices across areas,” 171 or whether it is
something else. This research concludes that “less than half the variation
in spending across areas is explained by population mix and differences
in the price of individual services.” 172 Instead, this research finds that
“[m]ore than half the variation in spending reflects differences in the use
of services.” 173 Nonetheless, while certain areas are spending more than
others, “existing research indicates that people in higher spending areas
do not receive better care.” 174
However, the question then becomes, how can we enable local
control if we have national standards? This is essentially a question of
whether decentralized enforcement is possible. In previous research on
water quality, it was found that decentralized enforcement may only be
feasible when “some metric can be found that is directly related to the
enforcement actions of the decentralized agencies.” 175 These metrics are
available for health plans, and hence we may be able to capture some of
the benefits from decentralized enforcement.
In order to determine whether this is the optimal approach for this
new payment reform policy, we will apply a federalism framework from
an earlier article. 176 To simplify analysis, this framework divides the
examination of the appropriate locus across three institutions:
Assessing the
enactment, implementation, and enforcement. 177

171. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 7.
174. Id. at 9. See also Elliott S. Fisher, David E. Wennberg, Thérèse A. Stukel, Daniel J.
Gottlieb, F. L. Lucas & Étoile L. Pinder, The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare
Spending, Part 1: The Content, Quality and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
273 (2003) [hereinafter Implications of Regional Variations]; John E. Wennberg, Elliott S. Fisher &
Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform, 21 HEALTH AFF. 96 (2002).
175. Dale B. Thompson, An Examination of the Consequences of Political, Administrative, and
Legal Institutions on the Implementation and Performance of Environmental Policies 63 (1998)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author). This chapter analyzed
“whether a centralized or decentralized enforcement body is most appropriate for a policy directed
at farming practices of members of irrigation districts.” Id. at 59. A decentralized enforcement
policy for irrigation districts was possible, because these “districts typically collect the runoff of
their members in a system of pipes and canals, and then discharge the collective runoff into water
bodies at a few particular points,” thereby enabling monitoring of the collective discharge. Id. at 60.
An individual district could then receive incentives based on its collective discharge, which would
in turn provide an incentive for the district to encourage and possibly enforce best management
practices by its members. Id.
176. Dale B. Thompson, Optimal Federalism Across Institutions: Theory and Applications
from Environmental Policies and Health Care, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J, 437, 437 (2009).
177. Id.
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appropriate scale is then done by “examining economies and
diseconomies of scale inherent in each of these institutions.” 178
For a health care payment system paid with public funds, enactment
would mean drafting the legislation that would set the general objectives
and payment mechanisms, and providing the funding for these
mechanisms. Implementation would include determining the precise
variables that will be utilized in this mechanism, overseeing the
application of these mechanisms, and then adjusting the variables as
needed to achieve the objectives of the legislation. Enforcement would
mean utilizing the payment scheme to affect the delivery of health care,
i.e., identifying what type of parties are paid under this payment scheme.
For each of these components, we then examine economies and
diseconomies of scale to determine the appropriate locus.
B.

Locus of Enactment, Implementation, and Enforcement

We now examine the optimal scale for each of these stages. For
enactment, there are significant economies of scale. Implementing large
scale programs such as Medicare is significantly costly. 179 Due to large
differences in incomes across different localities, financing these
programs at a national level will be more feasible, and involve fewer
disincentives due to higher taxes. 180
Also, we may desire to have consistency in the objectives for this
health policy: we may want to maintain and possibly improve the health
status of eligible individuals across the country, regardless of where they
live. As noted above, many have pointed to the problems of significant
geographic disparities in spending on health care and the delivery of
health services. 181 Having a consistent policy across the country would
significantly reduce many of these geographic disparities. Consistency
in objectives would therefore lead to economies of scale in enactment. 182
On the other hand, some may argue that we have inconsistencies in
objectives: in allocating scarce resources, one area may prefer to devote
more resources to health care than to other goods and services. Despite
this possibility, the ability of a state or locality to supplement spending
on health care if it chooses means that this possible diseconomy will be
less significant.
Consequently, we conclude that, overall, these
178. Id.
179. Id. at 451 (“The cost of a policy is minimized by having as small a scale as possible.”).
180. For more on this economy, see generally id.
181. See GOLD, supra note 169, at 9; Implications of Regional Variations, supra note 174, at
285; Wennberg et al., supra note 174, at 96.
182. See generally Thompson, supra note 176.
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economies suggest that this policy should be enacted at the federal level
rather than at a state or local level.
If enactment is done at the federal level, this policy could be
implemented either at the federal level or at a state level. 183 There can
be diseconomies of scale in implementation, because of the possible
benefits of experimentation across different states, i.e., the laboratories
of democracy. 184 However, one of the problems noted earlier was the
significant geographic variation in Medicare spending. 185 Again, to
enable more consistency in the application of this payment system,
implementation should also be done at the federal level, with a federal
agency, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
determining the specific variables to be used for assessing quality and
outcomes and the parameters related to these variables.
Enforcement is a key concern here. We could enforce at the lowest
level—the level of the individual doctor. Other choices include practice
level (groups of some doctors) payment, a level similar to an accountable
care organization, the level of a health plan, or possibly a state-wide
level. There is an inherent tradeoff between flexibility and risk in
enforcing these policies. A policy that rewards a particular set of health
care actions such as P4P involves very little risk for doctors, but the net
effect of this policy is to diminish flexibility as it rewards that particular
set of actions and by extension discourages others.
On the other hand, an outcomes-based policy enables a wide array
of health care actions, as long as these actions achieve the desired
outcomes. Nonetheless, these policies bring with them significant risks.
Health outcomes are dependent on a number of factors outside the
control of individual doctors. While risk adjustment can correct for
some of these factors, a number of other factors will remain. Hence, in
an outcomes-based payment system, the health providers will necessarily
face significant risks that their payment depends on factors outside of
their control. Larger organizations can bear risk more effectively, and so
there is an economy of scale here.

183. A federal policy can be implemented at the state level by requiring states to develop
implementation plans, with the provision that if a state fails to develop an appropriate plan, a federal
agency will then be responsible for implementing the policy in the state. This provides a significant
incentive for states to develop their own implementation plan.
184. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.”). See also Thompson, supra note 176.
185. See GOLD, supra note 169, at 9; Implications of Regional Variations, supra note 174, at
285; Wennberg et al., supra note 174, at 96.
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Another consideration is the ability of the enforcement body to
utilize decentralized enforcement. As noted above, decentralized
enforcement can be ineffective without a metric that depends on the
enforcement actions of the decentralized body. However, in this case,
we do have such a metric in the measures of health outcomes. While
decentralized enforcement is possible here, we still need to examine
related economies and diseconomies.
In the end, individual patients in consultation with their personal
doctors make the ultimate decisions on health care. These decisions
consist of choices on the application of particular medical procedures
and treatments, along with lifestyle choices. Providing an incentive to
improve health outcomes will therefore generate incentives to determine
appropriate medical procedure and treatment options, provide informed
recommendations over these options based on the individual patient’s
particular circumstances, and to encourage beneficial lifestyle choices.
The first two of these acts are done directly by individual doctors, and
the third frequently involves acts of individual doctors. Consequently,
any payment system whose enforcement locus is above the individual
doctor level will necessarily depend on decentralized enforcement, with
corollary incentive systems directed at individual doctors and individual
beneficiaries.
Assessing the desirability of treatment options and lifestyle choices
may vary depending on locality, custom, and other individual aspects.
As a result, these corollary incentive systems will need to be
appropriately tailored to the individual circumstances of doctors and
beneficiaries. As the number of doctors and beneficiaries increases, this
tailoring becomes more complex. Consequently, this will lead to a
diseconomy of scale in enforcement. In the next section, we will balance
these economies and diseconomies in enforcement and conclude that the
appropriate locus of enforcement will be at the plan level.
C.

Why Enforce at Plan Level

Enforcement could take place at a number of different levels. It
could be done at the level of individual doctors or group practices.
Accountable care organizations could also be the focus, directly
receiving the payments based on health outcomes, and then using
decentralized enforcement to create incentives among its practitioners to
improve outcomes. Focusing on ACOs would provide many benefits for
both effectiveness and efficiency, as this would enable coordination of
care. Finally, we could enforce at the health insurance plan level, again
relying upon decentralized enforcement.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 4
9-THOMPSON 44.3 PROOF-DONE

758

7/1/2016 4:12 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:727

We would face a number of problems if we chose to enforce at the
level of individual doctors or group practices. Doctors are significantly
concerned about the risks they may face under non fee-for-service
payment mechanisms.
Ronald Castellanos, a commissioner on
MedPAC, noted:
[P]roviders recognize a need to change Medicare fee-for-service
incentives and some inquiries into ACOs have been made in his area.
“But then the doctors in my community look at me and say, ‘Why do
you want to do this? Why do you want to move away from what we
call a very robust, perhaps overly funded in some respects, less-risk
program to go into something like this? They say what’s the incentive
that I have just to improve quality and resource use?” 186

As Elliott Fisher and others noted, individual doctors do not want to
face risks associated with external factors: “[P]roviders [prefer] to be
held accountable only for care that is within their direct control.” 187 This
is also related to doctors’ preference for autonomy: “Physician practice
and professional identity in the United States have long been
characterized by a high degree of professional autonomy and a culture of
individual responsibility . . . . Many physicians will resist the notion of
accepting a degree of responsibility for the care of all patients within
their local delivery system.” 188
Instead of directing a policy at individual doctors because of the
risks entailed, we need to direct the policy at a larger organization.
There are certainly a number of variables affecting health outcomes that
are not in the control of individual doctors. While some of these may be
accounted for through the use of risk adjustment, many will remain.
However, these individual risks can be balanced out when a large
enough sample size is used. 189 Within these large samples, individuals
with unobserved negative characteristics are balanced by other
individuals with unobserved positive characteristics. The larger the

186. Jane Norman, MEDPAC Probes Effectiveness of Accountable Care Organizations, WASH.
HEALTH POL’Y WK. IN REV., Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-in-Review/2009/Apr/April-20-2009/MEDPACProbes-Effectiveness-of-Accountable-Care-Organizations.aspx.
187. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 44. See also KANE, supra note 21, at 5.
188. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 54. See also Thomas P. Miller, Troyen A. Brennan &
Arnold Milstein, How Can We Make More Progress in Measuring Physicians’ Performance to
Improve the Value of Care?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1429, 1429 (2009) (noting that “many physicians
resist individual attribution”).
189. See KANE, supra note 21, at 7 (“Outcomes are essentially probability statements. Because
outcomes can be influenced by many different factors, one should not try to judge the success of any
single case; instead outcomes are addressed in the aggregate.”).
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sample size, the greater the probability that this balancing can occur.190
While physician groups may service many more patients than individual
doctors, we have seen that even large physician groups do not provide a
sufficiently large sample size: “Two years’ experience by the California
P4P program, however, reveals that the requisite claims data often are
incomplete or poorly coded and that even large physician groups have
too few patients experiencing most types of episodes to permit
statistically valid measurement for public reporting and incentive
payment.” 191
ACOs may be sufficiently large enough to enable this sharing of
risks. The minimum size for an ACO recommended in the June 2009
MedPAC report was “at least 5,000 patients.” 192 It is more likely that
health insurance plans would meet this need. Health plans carry a very
large number of enrollees. In a survey conducted by America’s Health
Insurance Plans in 2001, the average number of “HMO/POS enrollees
per health insurance plan was 161,186 while the average number of
Medicaid HMO enrollees was 93,698, and the average number of
Medicare HMO enrollees was 58,822.” 193 For this economy of scale,
health insurance plans’ significantly larger size than even ACOs gives
them an advantage.
In addition to large sample sizes, we will also need to look to
organizations that are prepared to respond to changes in financial
incentives. Charles Kahn notes that “payment reform succeeds in
achieving its intended result only when the targets of that reform are
organizationally and culturally able to meet the mandate of reformed
payment.” 194 These organizations will need the flexibility to adjust and
adapt to what their data implies for their effectiveness at achieving
desired health outcomes.
ACOs should be ready to adapt to changes in incentives. They are
designed, in particular, to be large enough to enable the coordination in
health care needed to achieve better outcomes. 195
Health plans also should be prepared to respond to changes in
financial incentives. As profit-driven organizations, there will be no
190. See id. (“Because outcomes rely on group data, there must be enough cases to analyze.”).
191. Robinson et al., supra note 63, at 1438.
192. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 40.
193. AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, 2002 AHIP SURV. HEALTH INS. PLANS 3 (2004),
available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/2_2002SurvChartBook.pdf. These averages were
over the 338 health plans in the sample. Id.
194. Charles N. Kahn III, Payment Reform Alone Will Not Transform Health Care Delivery, 28
HEALTH AFF. 216, 217 (2009).
195. See June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 51-52.
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stigma attached to responding to these direct financial incentives.
Furthermore, health plans have significant flexibility. Bryan Dowd and
Robert Berenson explain many of the benefits of private plans:
Private plans face no such constraints; like any private industry, plans
have full discretion to spend to improve efficiency or respond to
consumers’ preferences, and they do not have to live within arbitrarily
separate administrative and service budgets. Not only can private
plans increase administrative spending when there is a positive return
on that investment, they can spend even more if doing so provides
services for which their enrollees are willing to pay. For example, a
private plan might add more staff to its telephone or Internet helplines
to reduce waiting times, if enrollees were willing to pay higher
premiums for the improved service. The incentive for private health
plans to make such investments is fairly clear: the threat of reduced
enrollment. The government’s incentive is less clear.

....
Private health plans, on the other hand, enjoy considerable freedom to
negotiate contracts with providers and to test innovative care
management and payment strategies. Private plans also may be more
successful at some types of innovation than the CMS. 196

This ability of plans to adopt innovative care management tools is
echoed by researchers at the U.S. Department of Human Services:
“Many believe that private coordinated care plans are in a position to
implement such programs and better tailor care to individual
beneficiaries’ needs.” 197
While both organization types may be prepared to respond to
changes in financial incentives, ACOs may have some advantages over
health plans due to a diseconomy of scale related to decentralized
enforcement. The capability to use decentralized enforcement to
develop appropriately tailored incentives will depend on the
organizations’ familiarity with the particular environment. An ACO
would be located in a single locality, whereas health insurance plans will
frequently be spread across multiple localities. Informational needs to
develop decentralized incentives will mean that it will be easier to tailor
incentives for doctors participating in an ACO than for a health plan. 198

196. Berenson et al., supra note 71, at 36.
197. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 25.
198. The difficulties of managing large networks of doctors can be seen by examining the
challenges faced by diversified health organizations such as UnitedHealth Group.
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On the other hand, ACOs’ more localized nature can also be a
disadvantage. There are likely to be significant unobservable199 regional
differences that affect health outcomes. In an article about the
controversy surrounding the possible overstatement of achievable healthcare cost savings published in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, the
authors stated, “But the real difference in costs between, say, Houston
and Bismarck, N.D., may result less from how doctors work than from
how patients live. Houstonians may simply be sicker and poorer than
their Bismarck counterparts.” 200 Consequently, ACOs who are located
in a single locality will then face higher risks than health plans due to
these unobservable regional differences.
These risks and other risks associated with unobservable causes of
health outcomes are likely to be amplified in the nascent development of
health outcomes metrics. As argued above, the dependency of payments
on health outcome metrics should lead to the refinement and
improvement of these metrics. As a result, these risks will be reduced.
However, at this point in time, these measures remain incomplete, and
the significantly larger size of health plans compared with ACOs gives
health plans an important advantage in being able to spread these risks.
When all of these economies and diseconomies of scale are
considered, it seems that, at this point in time, health insurance plans’
better ability to spread these risks outweighs ACOs’ easier task of
tailoring decentralized incentives. As a result, for now, we should direct
enforcement of this new payment system based on health outcomes to
health insurance plans.
VII. APPLYING THIS PAYMENT SYSTEM TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
Thus, we have seen that this payment system should be enacted and
implemented at the federal level, with the payments directed to health
insurance plans. Health plans will then utilize decentralized enforcement
to provide direct incentives to their participating health providers to
improve health outcomes. The question then arises, where could we
apply this payment system? A natural application of this system would
be to MA.
MA is the program under which Medicare beneficiaries can choose
a private health plan to supply their medical care. 201 The private plan

199. I.e., differences that cannot be accounted for in risk adjustments.
200. Reed Abelson & Gardiner Harris, Study Cited for Health-Cost Cuts Overstated Its Upside,
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A1, A18.
201. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at v.
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then contracts with doctors and hospitals to provide health care
services. 202 The MA program had its beginning as the “Medicare +
Choice” program, which was started under the Balanced Budget Act of
1997. 203 Under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the name of
the program was changed to MA.204 The reach of the program is now
fairly extensive: “About 22 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were
enrolled in MA plans in 2008 and all beneficiaries have access to an MA
plan in 2009.” 205 Given that Medicare spending itself represents twentytwo percent of the entire national spending on health care in 2007, 206
MA on its own is responsible for approximately four to five percent.
Prior to the recent health reform legislation package, health plans
were paid using a capitation model under MA: “The annual per capita
rate of payment for each class of Medicare enrollees is equal to 95
percent of the AAPCC [adjusted average per capita cost] (as determined
under the provisions of §417.588) for that class of Medicare
enrollees.” 207 Under a capitation payment, a plan is paid a certain
amount for each enrollee, but then the plan bears the risk if average
spending exceeds the capitated amount. MA does adjust these payments
based on risk adjustment factors, such as geographic, enrollment, age,
sex, disability status, and “welfare and institutional status.” 208
These capitation rates are determined through a bidding process. 209
Plans submit bids for their expected average costs, and then the bids are
compared with county-level benchmarks. 210 If the bids exceed the
benchmark, then the plan’s enrollees must be charged the excess as a
premium. 211 If bids are lower than the benchmark, the “plan receives
75% as a rebate, which must be returned to enrollees in the form of
additional benefits or reduced premiums.” 212
202. Participating plans must offer a defined bundle of benefits, but may provide additional
ones.
203. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2009),
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-12.pdf [hereinafter MA Fact Sheet].
204. See Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Summary of Medicare Act of 2003, (2004),
http://www.nls.org/conf2004/summary-medicare-act-2003.htm.
205. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at xix.
206. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTHCARE SPENDING AND
THE
MEDICARE PROGRAM 5 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/
Jun09DataBooksec1.pdf.
207. CMS Payment to HMOs Rule, Determination of Rate, 42 C.F.R. § 417.584(b)(1) (2010).
208. CMS Computation of Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 417.588
(2010).
209. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. MA Fact Sheet, supra note 203, at 2.
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Large plans play a significant role in MA: “Three firms—
UnitedHealthcare, Humana, and Kaiser—plus firms affiliated with
BCBS [Blue Cross Blue Shield] account for more than half (53 percent)
of MA enrollment at the end of 2007.” 213 In addition to these large
plans, there have been many new entrants recently: “The number of
firms offering PFFS plans has more than quadrupled over the past three
years.” 214 However, some of these recent entrants provide lower quality
care than more established plans: “Quality is not uniform among MA
plans. . . . More recent plans have lower rankings on many measures.” 215
Payment rates for MA plans have exceeded the average costs under
the traditional fee-for-service structure of traditional Medicare: 216 “MA
payments per enrollee are projected to be 114 percent of comparable
FFS spending for 2009.” 217 These higher payments in turn allow the
plans to “offset cost sharing for Medicare benefits and cover additional
services that traditional Medicare is not authorized to offer.” 218 These
benefits have had a significant effect on the growth of MA. 219
MedPAC recently advocated payment system reforms for MA. 220
MedPAC was concerned that the payment rates for MA were set too
high: “Instead of encouraging innovative plans, the current MA
payment system encourages inefficient plans, because the benchmarks
used as bidding targets are set too high, and plan payments are not linked
Consequently, many, including the Obama
to performance.” 221
Administration, recommended reducing payments to MA plans. 222
MedPAC suggested a variety of revised methods to calculate MA
benchmarks. 223
Included in these options was the use of competitive bidding. A
policy paper issued by researchers at the U.S. Department of Human
Services suggested, “For a number of reasons, moving away from

213. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage in 2008, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ii (2008),
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7775.pdf [hereinafter MA in 2008].
214. Id.
215. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 252.
216. See MA in 2008, supra note 213, at iii-iv.
217. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at xix.
218. MA in 2008, supra note 213, at iv.
219. Id.
220. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 155.
221. Id. at 202.
222. See OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 73, at 69. See also PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS,
supra note 3, at vi (describing five options for changing the benchmarks used to pay MA plans).
223. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 184-99. See also PAYMENT FOR MA
PLANS, supra note 33, at 21 (noting three other rationales for MA plans receiving a higher average
payment than fee-for-service plans).
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administered benchmarks to ones set through a competitive bidding
process would be a preferred method for modifying current payments.”
224

As noted above, the health care reform legislation package included
a number of changes to MA. Payment rates are scheduled to be reduced,
and a number of new regulations apply to health plans participating in
MA. Nonetheless, the basic structure remains: health plans still receive
a risk-adjusted per-capita payment for each beneficiary that enrolls with
them.
The proposal presented by this article would require additional
amendments to part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act. 225 Under
this proposal, large health plans participating in MA would be
required 226 to submit health outcomes data, and then receive their
compensation solely on the basis of these health outcomes metrics, after
appropriate risk-adjustments. Health plans under MA already submit
much of the data needed here: “MA plans are required to submit several
types of data on quality measures, including: Healthcare Effectiveness
Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (CAHPS), and Health Outcomes Survey
Population data is also collected to determine risk
(HOS).” 227
adjustment factors, under the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services Hierarchical Condition Category (CMS-HCC) risk adjustment
system. 228

224. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting, however, that “there are a number
of important policy questions to address with regard to the exact structure of the bidding process and
potential competition with the traditional program”).
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395W-21-1395w-28 (2010).
226. While a voluntary approach could work, the uncertainties involved imply that many plans
might choose to continue in the more certain per capita payment system. Significant participation
would probably be needed in order to get advancements in health outcomes metrics. As a result, a
mandatory approach may be necessary to make the program achievable in the long run.
227. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7. See also memorandum from Cynthia G.
Tudor, Director, Medicare Drug Benefit and C & D Data Group, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs, 2009 HEDIS, HOS and CAHPS Measures for Reporting by Medicare Managed Care
Contractors, 1-2 (Dec. 9, 2008), https://www.cms.gov/SpecialNeedsPlans/Downloads/
HEDIS09Measures_120908.pdf (noting that HMOs and preferred provider organizations [PPOs]
are required to submit this data for 2009, and that private fee-for-service organizations [PFFS] will
be required to submit this data in 2010).
228. See JAMES M. VERDIER, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE RATE SETTING AND RISK ADJUSTMENT:
A PRIMER FOR STATES CONSIDERING CONTRACTING WITH MEDICARE ADVANTAGE SPECIAL NEEDS
PLANS TO COVER MEDICAID BENEFITS 8 (2006), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/
Medicare_Advantage_State_Primer.pdf. For details on the specific factors utilized, see Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Announcement of Calendar Year 2007 Medicare Advantage
Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies, Enclosure IV (2006),
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As the federal agency responsible for implementing this policy, the
CMS would then be responsible for using this data to compensate health
plans. In order to do so, CMS would first have to establish vectors
RABP and V, along with matrix A. 229 One of the more difficult tasks
would be to specify V, the vector of the associated valuations of
different health outcomes. In constructing this vector, CMS would begin
by offering initial estimates of these valuations. CMS would then go
back to historical data to determine whether the compensation paid out
hypothetically under the new system using population and outcome data
from previous years would be approximately the same as their actual
compensation in those years. CMS could then scale the compensation
factors in vector V to better match hypothetical and actual compensation.
Scaling would preserve the relative valuations between different
outcomes.
Initially, to ensure support of affected health plans, it may be
necessary for these factors to “overcompensate” these plans. This
“overcompensation” may lead to similar criticisms as others have made
about MA’s overcompensation relative to Medicare FFS. However,
what these criticisms fail to account for are the risks faced by these
plans. Under FFS, providers face no risk on their level of compensation,
because they are compensated for all of the services they provide. On
the other hand, with a capitated system such as the current MA system,
providers face the risk that their beneficiaries may require more-thanaverage levels of services. These providers will not receive any
additional compensation for these extra services, and so the providers
bear these risks that their costs may be higher than these capitated rates.
In a similar manner, switching to the new payment system based on
health outcomes will also bring significant risks to participating health
plans.
Furthermore, these criticisms about possible overcompensation are
misplaced. Our first priority should not be a slight “overpayment” in the
initial iterations of this system, but rather on the future trend of health
care expenditures. We have seen a similar path before in the design of
the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) emissions
trading program for the Los Angeles area. 230 For RECLAIM, the initial
amount of emission permits initially allocated was slightly greater than
the amount of emissions generated in previous years. However, these
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/
Announcement2007.pdf.
229. See supra Part V.C.
230. See Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets:
Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645 (2000).
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allocation levels were reduced by approximately forty percent in later
years. 231 Similarly, an initial “overpayment” under this system should
be less significant than reducing the escalation of future health
expenditures.
In the first iterations of this system, CMS would then combine their
generated vectors RABP and V, matrix A, and reported information in
vectors Pi and Ωi, to calculate the compensation for a particular plan.
Future iterations would be even more significant. Progress on health
outcome measures and risk adjustment could be incorporated into
revisions of the compensation formula.
Additionally, with the
exceptions of adjustments for overall inflation, it could be desirable for
the base rates and valuation measures to remain constant. If so, this
would imply that health care expenditures under this system would only
increase as the measures of health outcomes improved. As these
measures improved (thereby reducing the risks involved), additional
levels of providers such as ACOs could then be incorporated into this
system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article proposes changing MA 232 so that participating health
plans are compensated solely on the basis of health outcomes, with
appropriate risk adjustments. It makes this proposal because health
outcomes metrics are a better instrument for compensating health care
providers. Additionally, the article finds that the optimal scale for using
this instrument at this time is at the level of health insurance plans,
making MA an ideal initial setting for this system.
There have been many other recommendations to address the
inefficient incentives created under the dominant health payment system,
fee-for-service. These recommendations include pay-for-performance,
competitive pricing, accountable care organizations (ACOs), and
bundled payments. Each one of these recommendations plays some role
in the landmark health reform legislative package, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act.
However, these recommendations and the package of reforms in the
legislation fail to address perhaps the most significant problem for health

231. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 1997 AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT PLAN ch.2 app.III, at III-2-29 tab.2-10A (1996), available at ftp://ftp.aqmd.gov/
pub/aqmp/appendix/ap3.exe.
232. Doing so requires amending title XVIII, part C, of the Social Security Act.
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care: the need to control costs in the long term. This is because they
still rely on quality measurements and the delivery of services. This
article argues that the best way to control costs in the long run is to
reward providers based solely on health outcomes.
There are a number of obstacles to using this metric. Doctors will
oppose a system where they are held accountable for health outcomes
when these outcomes depend so much on the patient’s own choices.
This article suggests that the solution to this is to utilize decentralized
enforcement, where a large collection of health care providers is held
responsible for health outcomes. By using decentralized enforcement,
the collective body can determine properly tailored incentives for their
individual providers, which will not hold individual doctors accountable
for each individual patient but nonetheless still lead to overall
improvements in health outcomes. 233
Another criticism is that the health outcomes measures themselves
are not sufficiently developed. What this criticism means is that using
these measures will entail significant risks. But it does not mean that we
should not use these measures: instead, operation of this compensation
system will likely lead to significant improvements in the quality of
these measures.
This article then uses a federalism framework to determine the
appropriate scale for different stages of applying this payment method
policy. It concludes that the optimal level to enact and implement the
policy is at the federal level.
It then compares economies and diseconomies of scale to determine
the optimal locus of enforcement, i.e., what group of providers would be
held accountable by tying their payment solely to health outcomes.
Accountable care organizations would be a good group to utilize because
they could design narrowly tailored incentives for their providers.
However, this article concludes that health insurance plans would be a
better level for enforcement. Like the ACOs, health plans can also use
decentralized enforcement. Their broader size both in terms of number
of enrollees and in geographical coverage means that health plans will
also be better at handing the significant risks entailed in this payment
system. This is particularly true during the initial operation of this
system, when outcomes measures have yet to be fully developed.
Given that what is needed is a federal program where health plans
are compensated, this article suggests that the natural place to implement
this payment system is MA. There certainly will be political opposition

233. Quality measurements could be utilized here.
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to making this change just as we saw with competitive bidding, 234
notably in specifying compensation levels for different health outcomes.
Nonetheless, there are significant advantages to implementing it in MA.
Much of the data needed to use this system is available because health
plans are already required to collect and report it.
Meanwhile, while it may be difficult to achieve politically, doing so
will enable us to finally get incentives right for health care. This system
does not reward providers for supplying any health service, regardless of
effectiveness or desirability, as is sometimes done by a FFS system. It
also does not reward providers for offering services that meet prescribed
quality guidelines, which may not permit sufficient flexibility for some
individual patients. Instead, it rewards providers for maintaining and
improving health outcomes, thereby enabling them to “experience the
joy of healing those who seek [their] help.” 235
This approach offers an opportunity to finally control the long-term
growth of health care expenditures. In this system, if health care
outcomes stay the same, risk-adjusted real 236 expenditures on health care
can remain constant. Under this approach, health care expenditures only
rise when overall health care outcomes improve. Those health care
dollars may be worth it.

234. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting that “in the past . . . , health
plans and their supporters have resisted such a bidding approach”); id. at 18 (noting that “a
[competitive bidding] system, as in any competitive market, means increased uncertainty about the
chances for reward and the risk of financial loss for participants. Previous experience with
Medicare’s competitive pricing demonstrations, which were opposed by the insurance industry,
suggests that health plans are reluctant to participate under such pricing uncertainty”) (citing
Berenson et al., supra note 71)).
235. Louis Lasagna, The Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version (1964), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
nova/doctors/oath_modern.html.
236. As opposed to nominal.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/4

42

